North Dakota Law Review
Volume 72

Number 3

Article 11

1996

Insurance - Commencement of Risk: Determining the Appropriate
Trigger of Coverage under a First-Party Property Insurance Policy
for Loss Due to Progressive Damage in North Dakota
Aaron J. Dorrheim

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dorrheim, Aaron J. (1996) "Insurance - Commencement of Risk: Determining the Appropriate Trigger of
Coverage under a First-Party Property Insurance Policy for Loss Due to Progressive Damage in North
Dakota," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 72 : No. 3 , Article 11.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol72/iss3/11

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

INSURANCE-COMMENCEMENT OF RISK: DETERMINING THE
APPROPRIATE TRIGGER OF COVERAGE UNDER A FIRST-PARTY
PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICY FOR LOSS DUE TO
PROGRESSIVE DAMAGE IN NORTH DAKOTA
Kief FarmersCoop. Elevator Co. v. FarmlandMut. Ins. Co.,
534 N.W.2d 28 (N.D. 1995)
I.

FACTS

In 1985, Plaintiff-Petitioner, Kief Farmers Cooperative Elevator
Company (Kief), constructed a grain storage bin at its Butte facility.1
However, the contractor installed the wall-side discharge flume hood
incorrectly.2 This particular flume system was used only once to load
grain at the Butte facility on May 26, 1988.3 Kiefs professional engineer stated that this use immediately damaged the upper half of the bin's
wall and roof.4 This amount of damage to the bin increased with every
subsequent load and unload cycle of the bin after the discharge flume's
initial use. 5 Kief's engineer said the damage "would be difficult, if not
impossible, ...

to observe or discover" by a non-expert. 6 The damage

was brought to the attention of Kief's employees on May 15, 1992.7
Kief subsequently incurred expenses repairing the bin and a loss of
business income while the repairs were being done. 8
Defendant-Respondent, Farmland Mutual Insurance Company
(Farmland), provided one-year policies for property, casualty, and
liability coverage to Kief continuously from July 1, 1984, through
August 1, 1991.9 Old Republic Insurance (Old Republic) covered
1. Kief Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28, 30 (N.D. 1995).
2. Id. A discharge flume hood is part of a system on a grain elevator used to load and unload unit
trains. See Brief of Appellant at 2, Kief FarmersCoop. (No. 950011).
3. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 30.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 30.
9. Id. Kief's policy provided in part:
h. Policy Period, Coverage Territory
"Under this coverage section:
"(1) We cover loss or damage commencing:
"(a) During the policy period shown in the declarations;..
"We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary
suspension of your operations during the period of restoration. The suspension must be
caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property covered under the Real Property
and Business PersonalPropertyand Stock coverage of this policy, caused by or resulting
from any covered cause of loss."
... The "period of restoration" is defined in part as:
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certain specified losses at the Butte facility from August 1991 until
August 1992.10 On May 6, 1994, Kief sued Farmland and Old Republic,
alleging both were jointly and severally liable for the damages to the
grain bin.l1 Old Republic was dismissed from the action after settling
with Kief, who proceeded against Farmland.' 2 Kief then moved for
partial summary judgment, asserting that the damage and loss which
occurred during the Farmland policy periods were covered by the insurance contract. 13 Farmland resisted the motion, and a hearing was held in
Burleigh County District Court.14
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmland. 15
The court concluded that the policy did not provide coverage for an
accident or occurrence, which commenced during the policy period but
did not yield loss or damage until after the coverage period had ended. 16
The trial court also ruled that the language of the contract was unambiguous and that, unless otherwise provided, coverage was triggered when
the property damage becomes known to the owner.17
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that summary judgment was inappropriate. 18 The court stated that when
"[c]onstruing the policy as a whole, . . . a real but undiscovered loss or
damage, proved in retrospect to have commenced during the policy
period, [would] trigger[ I coverage, irrespective of the time the loss or
damage became manifest." 19
II.

LEGAL HISTORY

Although insurance law is theoretically a category of contract law,
insurance law has developed to occupy a world of its own.20 Furthermore, no area of insurance law creates more confusion for courts than
"the period of time that:
"a. Begins with the date of direct physical loss or damage caused by or resulting from
any Covered Cause of Loss at the described premises; and
"b. Ends on the date when the property at the described premises should be repaired,
rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality.
"The expiration date of this policy will not cut short the period of restoration."
Id. at 31.
10. Id. at 30-31.
11. Id.at 31.
12. Id.
13. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 31.
14. Brief of Appellee at 1, Kief FarmersCoop. (No. 95-0011).
15. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 31.
16. Id.
17. Id.at 31.
18. Id.at 36.
19. Id.
20. Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and
Self-Insurance, 22 PFPP. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1995).
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coverage disputes resulting from an insurer's policy language. 2 1 This
confusion is only compounded by the differences in first-party and
22
third-party property damage and by the existence of multiple insurers.
Until Kief Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co. v. FarmlandMutual
Insurance Co.,23 there had been no first-party property damage cases
dealing with the issue of progressive losses and successive insurance
policies in North Dakota. 24 North Dakota has, however, dealt previously
25
with issues of policy ambiguity.
In 1971, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Haugen v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.,26 determined that by statute, insurance policies were to
be interpreted as a whole. 27 This method of interpretation resolves ambiguities by giving meaning to all provisions if "reasonably practicable."28 In Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc.,29 a dispute arose after
30
the plaintiffs' crops were damaged by defendant's aerial spraying.
The plaintiffs were insured by a policy which contained an exclusion for
property damage arising from any substance discharged from any aircraft. 3 ' The court adopted the doctrine of "reasonable expectations"
and extended coverage to the insured because of the ambiguity created
by the exclusions.3 2 However, no majority of the North Dakota Supreme
Court since Mills has relied upon the doctrine of reasonable expectations
for interpreting ambiguous policies. 33
Generally, in North Dakota, the interpretation of an insurance
policy is fully reviewable on appeal as a question of law.34 In applying
contract construction principles, courts will give effect to the mutual

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 534 N.W.2d 28 (N.D. 1995).
24. Brief of Appellee at 12, Kief FarmersCoop. (No. 95-0011).
25. See, e.g., Haugen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 191 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 1971).
26. 191 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 1971).
27. Haugen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 191 N.W.2d 274, 280 (N.D. 1971) (citing ND. CENT. CODE
§ 9-07-06 (1987)).
28. Id. See Kenneth J. Homer, Jr., Comment, Insurance-Contracts-TheAmbiguity in the Doctrine of ReasonableExpectations, 62 N D. L. REV. 423, 432 (1986) (stating that Haugen was the first
surfacing of the doctrine of reasonable expectations in North Dakota). Under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, an insurance policy is interpreted to mean what a reasonable person in the insured's
position would think it meant. Haugen, 191 N.W.2d at 279.
29. 250 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1977)
30. Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663,666 (N.D. 1977).
31. Id. at 667.
32. Id. at 673-74.
33. Homer, supra note 28, at 433. See also Nunn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 272
N.W.2d 780,786 n.l (N.D. 1978) (stating that the members of the "court have disagreed as to the
applicability of the 'Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations"' when considering the status of insured).
34. See, e.g., Hart Constr. Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins., 514 N.W.2d 384, 388 (N.D. 1994)
(citing Miller v. Schwartz, 354 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1984) and holding that the determination of a
written contract's legal effect by its construction is a question of law for the court to decide).
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intentions of the parties. 3 5 These intentions will be ascertained by courts
through the specific language of the contract while giving effect to all of
its provisions, if possible. 36
Language in a policy which is unambiguous will be given its clear
meaning.37 However, ambiguities will be determined to exist when
language can reasonably be construed to have at least two different
meanings.38 Courts will decide as a matter of law whether or not a
contract is clear and unambiguous.39
Courts will consider whether a person who has no legal or insurance
business training can clearly understand the policy language. 40 Because
policies are generally drafted by insurance company experts, the company must assume the consequences of ambiguities and resulting confusion. 4 1 Therefore, in attempting to resolve ambiguities in an insurance
contract, the equities are balanced in favor of the insured since insurance
policies are adhesion contracts. 42
The North Dakota Supreme Court previously dealt with an insurance coverage trigger case in Friendship Homes, Inc. v. American States
Insurance Cos. 4 3 In Friendship Homes, the owner of a building damaged by fire attempted to recover from the fireplace installer's liability
insurer for negligent installation. 44 The court rejected the owner's argument that the property damage occurred when the fireplace was negligently installed. 4 5 Instead, the court, in the context of third-party
damage, found the policy clear and unambiguous and that the occurrence of the actual damage was the fire itself and not the wrongful act of
negligent installation.46
In other jurisdictions, courts have' developed several different
theories to determine when loss or damage occurs within third-party
35. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574,577 (N.D. 1993) (citing N.D. CENT.
§§ 9-07-03, -04 (1987), and stating that the court will look at the mutual intentions of the parties
at the time of contracting).
36. Id.
37. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaRoque, 486 N.W.2d 235,237-38 (N.D. 1992) (citing
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-02).
38. See, e.g., State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Sigman, 508 N.W.2d 323, 325 (N.D. 1993)
(finding language in an insurance policy ambiguous due to broad scope and a lack of express
conditions).
39. Id. (citing Continental Casualty Co., 499 N.W.2d at 577-78).
40. See, e.g., Aid Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Geiger, 294 N.W.2d 411,414-15 (N.D. 1980) (explaining
how the doctrine of adhesion contracts is to be applied as tool for interpreting insurance policies).
41. Id.
42. See, eg., Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179, 181 (N.D. 1994) (finding that if uncertainty still exists after applying interpretation rules, the contract language "is to be
construed most strongly against the party who drafted the contract").
43. 450 N.W.2d 778 (ND. 1990).
44. Friendship Homes, Inc. v. American States Ins. Cos., 450 N.W.2d 778, 778 (N.D. 1990).
45. Id. at 780.
46. Id.
CODE
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liability.47 Problems of determining which event triggers coverage are
compounded when the condition which causes the loss or damage takes
48
place at a previous time, but the loss is manifested at a later time.
One view is that coverage is triggered at the time of exposure: this is
the "exposure" rule. 49 Under this theory, when manifestation is delayed,
liability coverage is triggered at the first exposure to a harmful or injurious condition during the period that the policy is in effect. 50 The
injury is considered to have occurred at the time of exposure to this
1
harmful condition, even though the actual injury or loss occurs later. 5
Another view is that coverage is triggered when an injury becomes
manifest: this is the "manifestation" rule. 52 Under this rule, when a
manifestation of injury is delayed, coverage is not triggered until the
damage becomes known to the victim or property owner. 5 3 The policy
which is in effect at the time "the loss or damage is discovered, or
reasonably should [be] discovered," is triggered. 54 Because of this rule,
the company which provides coverage at the time the damage becomes
manifest pays the complete claim. 55
The "continuous trigger" or "triple trigger" theory finds that
delayed manifestation triggers coverage so "that insurance policies in
effect during different time periods . . . all impose a duty to defend or
indemnify."56 This is often done to best represent the competing interests of both the insurer and insured. 57 This theory is actually a hybrid of
the exposure, actual injury, and manifestation triggers. 58
The final view is that coverage is triggered at the time of the
injury-the "injury-in-fact" rule. 59 This theory states that when manifestation of injury is delayed, coverage is triggered when the actual
47. See Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Event Triggering Liability Insurance Coverage as
Occurring Within Period of Time Covered by Liability Insurance Policy Where Injury or Damage is
Delay-Modern Cases, 14 A.L.R. 5th 695 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (discussing cases involving issues of
insurance coverage triggers). See also Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 399
N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (providing a summary of approaches to decide when damage
or injury occurs).
48. Richmond, supra note 20, at 1429.
49. McMahon, supra note 47, § 3.
50. Id. This theory developed in asbestos litigation as these types of diseases are not discovered
until many years after exposure to asbestos Richmond, supra note 20, at 1430. The exposure theory
has since been used for general toxic torts and environmental litigation. Id.
51. McMahon, supra note 47, § 3.
52. Id.§4.
53. Id.
54. Richmond, supra note 20, at 1431.
55. Id. at 1432.
56. McMahon, supra note 47, § 5; see also Richmond, supra note 20, at 1432 (discussing the
"triple trigger" theory).
57. Richmond, supra note 20, at 1432.
58. Id.
59. McMahon, supra note 47, § 6.
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property damage first occurred. 60 This theory triggers those policies in
effect when the property damage or injury occurs, even if the loss is not
6
discovered during the policy period. 1
However, an important distinction must be made between first-party
property insurance cases and third-party liability cases.62 Third-party
liability policies are predicated on tort negligence and cover more risks
than first-party policies. 6 3 First-party property policies, conversely, turn
on whether the policy language offers coverage for either an explicit or
implicit claim. 6 4
The leading case for the allocation of loss within the context of
first-party property insurance is Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance
v. Superior Court.65 The California Supreme Court in Prudential-LMI
adopted the manifestation rule "because it provide[d] a well-defined
standard for insurers and claimants."66 Advocates of this rule argue that
a well-defined standard is in the public interest because without the rule
insurers could possibly contest every claim. 67 It is with this background
the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Kief.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
Kief Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mutual
Insurance Co. was reviewed on an appeal from summary judgment. 68
As such, the North Dakota Supreme Court considered all facts in the
light most favorable to Kief Farmers Cooperative. 69
The court first stated that with property insurance, the occurrence
and manifestation of damage is usually simultaneous, therefore avoiding
this type of interpretation problem. 70 However, because the damage
occurred well before its manifestation, the court stated there was an
60. Id. See Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 917 (Haw. 1994) (finding that the
injury-in-fact rule differs from the manifestation rule and the exposure rules only when the injury
itself is not simultaneous with exposure or manifestation). See also Michael J. Brady & Kelly C.
Franks, Triggerof Coverage in Environmental Cases, 45 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 65,73 (1994)
(stating that the justification for the injury-in-fact rule is that it is most consistent with the language of
the insurance policies).
61. Richmond, supranote 20, at 1430.
62. Id. at 1443.
63. Id. at 1443-44.
64. Id. at 1443.
65. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990). See Richmond, supra note 20, at 1444 (discussing the leading case on loss allocation for first-party property
insurance). See infra note 82, and accompanying text (discussing Prudential-LMIfurther).
66. Richmond, supranote 20, at 1445.
67. Id.
68. Kief Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28, 31 (N.D. 1995).
69. Id. at 31-32 (citing Roen Land Trust v. Frederick, 530 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1995)). See also
ND. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
70. Kief FarmersCoop., 534 N.W.2d at 32.
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ambiguity as to which event triggered policy coverage. 7 1 The court held
that the contract in this factual situation was ambiguous, reversing the
holding of the trial court. 7 2 The court stated that the ambiguity existed
because both "Kief and Farmland . . . offered rational but different
meanings for the policy coverage provision." 7 3 The court then turned
to interpreting the ambiguous language.74
Although the policy provided by Farmland included first-party
property insurance coverage,75 the court looked to what other jurisdictions have done in the context of third-party liability insurance to resolve
the trigger coverage ambiguity. 7 6 The court looked to the specific
language of each of the coverage-trigger theories in the third-party
liability context to lend guidance in interpreting the first-party property
insurance policy.77
Kief asserted that the court had already adopted the injury-in-fact
rule in Friendship Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Cos. 7 8
However, the court did not accept the argument because Friendship
Homes was materially different. 7 9 The court stated that unlike Kief,
Friendship Homes involved a third-party liability policy, and there was
no delay in manifestation of the damage or loss.80

71. Id.
72. Id. See, eg., Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638,
642 (N.D. 1979) (holding that a fidelity loss policy was ambiguous as to determining when the loss
occurred through employee embezzlement). Farmland attempted to prevent Kief from raising this
ambiguity issue on appeal because Kief did not claim it was ambiguous in the trial court. Brief for
Appellee at 4, Kief Farmers Coop. (No. 950011). However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that where "both parties to a contract contend [at trial] that [the] contract provisions are
unambiguous.... the parties together necessarily raise an ambiguity issue." Kief Farmers Coop.. 534
N.W.2d at 32, n.2 (citing Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 778 (N.D. 1984)). Thus, the
court determined that the parties sufficiently raised the issue to preserve it on appeal. Id.
73. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 32.
74. Id. at 35. The ambiguity largely revolved around the policy language which covered "loss or
damage commencing ... [d]uring the policy period." Id.
75. Id. at 30. A first-party property insurance contract has been defined as one which provides
coverage for an insured's loss or damage to property where upon the happening of an insured risk, the
insurer will pay money to the insured. Id. at 33 n.4 (citing Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d
894, 906 (Haw. 1994)).
76. Id. at 32-33. A third-party liability insurance policy is a policy which provides coverage for
the insured's liability to another where the insurer provides a contractual obligation to pay judgments
against the insured for the insured's negligence. Id. at 32-33 n.3 (citing Sentinel Ins. Co., 875 P.2d at
906).
77. Id. at 33.
78. 450 N.W.2d 778, 779 (N.D. 1990) (construing an occurrence liability policy which defined
damage or injury to property as to that which occurs during the policy period). See Brief for Appellant at 20, Kief Farmers Coop. (No. 950011) (discussing the applicability of the injury-in-fact rule in
Friendship Homes).
79. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 33.
80. Id.
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Farmland urged the court to adopt the California Supreme Court's
approach.8l This would apply the manifestation rule to first-party property damage cases dealing with progressive losses and successive insurance policies. 8 2 The North Dakota Supreme Court refused, however, to
adopt the manifestation rule as set forth in Prudential-LMI,based on the
following reasons.8 3
First, the court found that while Prudential-LM1 may provide more
certainty within the insurance industry, it refused to believe that the
manifestation rule was an industry-wide standard.8 4 Second, the court
further stated that it did not believe the benefits of certainty always outweigh the interests of justice and the rights of the party to a contract.8 5
The court thus concluded that in order to resolve ambiguities,
policy language and the nature of the loss or damage must be examined
to determine the appropriate trigger.8 6 The court went on to find that a
review of the entire insurance contract between Kief and Farmland not
only highlighted the ambiguity, but also helped resolve it.87
The court noted that the insurance contract at issue covered "loss or
damage commencing . . . [diuring the policy period." 88 The court
found no discovery-type language, language which placed conditions or
language which connected property loss or damage to discovery of such
damage. 8 9 In fact, the policy language did "not even hint that property

81. Brief of Appellee at 10, Kief Farmers Coop. (No. 950011) (citing Prudential-LMI Ins. v.
Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1243 (1990), which created fixed liability for first-party property losses
solely on the insurer whose policy was in force at the time the progressive damage became appreciable or manifest).
82. Id. In Prudential.LMI,the California Supreme Court stated that the manifestation rule would
promote certainty in the insurance industry, lower costs to the insured, and would enable the insured to
reasonably expect their present carrier to provide coverage. 798 P.2d at 1246-47. Prudential-LMI
involved an apartment building owner who sustained progressive property damage when the insured
discovered an extensive crack in the building's foundation. Id. at 1232-33. The crack could have
occurred over several policy periods, so the insured sued four companies which had insured the
building over a fifteen year period. Id. at 1234. One of the companies, Prudential, provided coverage
for a period prior to the manifestation of the damage. Id. The court found in favor of Prudential by
limiting liability to the carrier which insured the property when the damage was manifest. Id. at 1232.
83. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 35.
84. Id.
85. Id. See Savoy Medical Supply Co. v. F & H Mfg. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 703,710 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding that justice warranted the application of the injury-in-fact rule, despite the argument
that use of the manifestation rule may decrease administrative costs).
86. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 35. See Leafland Group-II, Montgomery Towers Ltd.
Partnership v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 881 P.2d 26, 28 (N.M. 1994) (using policy language to find
that a diminution in a property's value due to asbestos was not a covered loss within the policy's
insuring clause); Villella v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 725 P.2d 957,958 (Wash. 1986) (finding
that a homeowner's policy did not cover damage from a foundation failure occurring after the policy
period).
87. Kief FarmersCoop., 534 N.W.2d at 35.
88. Id.
89. Id. See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1497
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the unambiguous intention of occurrence language requires the insured
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damage must be known to anyone in order to trigger coverage, or that
property damage did not exist unless someone knew about it."90
Because discovery language was absent in the policy's first-party
property coverage section, and discovery language was present in a
section concerning employee dishonesty, the court found that Farmland
did know how to limit coverage.91 Therefore, the court stated that
discovery was not a prerequisite to the occurrence of a loss or damage
under the property insurance policy.92
The court found that the language used for first-party property
coverage closely resembled occurrence policy language in a third-party
liability context. 9 3 The court further doubted "that a person not trained
in the law or in the insurance business would construe" the policy
language to require a manifestation trigger. 9 4 Thus, the court refused to
rewrite the contract to exclude coverage based on the manifestation
rule .95

The court concluded that under this policy, a real but undiscovered
loss or damage, which commenced during the policy period, triggered
coverage regardless of the time the loss or damage was discovered or
manifested. 96 The court reversed the trial court's decision and held that
the evidence suggested that some form of damage to the grain bin began
to establish, on a case-by-case basis, the injury-in-fact to trigger occurrence liability), afO d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984); SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 588,596 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding that dry-cleaning chemicals which damaged groundwater triggered coverage
when the damage occurred, not when the damage was later discovered), affd in part,rev'd in part on
other grounds, 533 N.W.2d 603 (Minn. 1995).
90. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 35. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724
F. Supp. 474, 486 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that where the manufacturer's general liability policy
unambiguously dictated application of an injury-in-fact coverage trigger, the court was forced to
enforce the contract as written under Michigan law); United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
643 N E.2d 1226, 1253-54 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that a property owner's asbestos discovery was
an inappropriate trigger because of a lack of requisite language in the occurrence policies).
91. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 35-36. The other portion of the policy which was
compared regarded "Crime Insurance relating to Employee Dishonesty." Id. at 36. This section
provided that loss was "covered only if discovered not later than one year from the end of the policy
period, and then th[e] insurance shall apply only to loss sustained during the policy period." Id.
92. Id. at 36.
93. Id. An occurrence policy coverage begins when the insured event occurs during the policy
period, and coverage is generally not affected by when a claim is made. Id. (citing R. LONG, THE LAW
Op' LIABILrrY INSURANCE § 1.08[4] (1995)). However, a "claims made" or "discovery" policy allows
coverage only where an insured's claim is made to the insurer during this period. Id. This is
significant because a "claims made" or "discovery" policy is designed to limit the liabilities of an
insurance company. Id. (citing Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894,918 (Haw. 1994)). The
result is lower premiums for the insured than are charged for "occurrence" policy. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. This reluctance of the court was based partly on an awareness that interpreting an "occurrence" policy to provide coverage only when the loss or injury has manifested, transforms the
more expensive occurrence type policy into a less expensive "claims made or discovery" type policy.
Id.
96. Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 36.
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while the Farmland policies were in effect.9 7 Summary judgment in
favor of Farmland was therefore inappropriate.98
IV. IMPACT
In North Dakota, a court considering a first-party property damage
case, where there is progressive damage, will first look to the specific
policy language to determine what event, if any, should trigger coverage.
If the policy is then found to be ambiguous on this issue, rather than
applying a bright-line rule as have other jurisdictions, the court will look
to the language of the entire policy and nature of the loss or damage to
determine the appropriate coverage trigger.9 9
This approach will create uncertainty for some insurers within North
Dakota. For those insurers who have or have had policies containing
similar ambiguous language regarding when progressive damage coverage commences, liability could be extended beyond the expiration date
of the policy. Because of the possibility of claims being brought after
coverage has supposedly ended, insurers may not be able to predict risk
or exposure to liability accurately in establishing necessary reserves.100
This raises questions of how to calculate reserves and the cost of policies
for North Dakota consumers.
This possible extended liability for insurers in North Dakota may
not yet be very substantial because occurrence and manifestation of a
loss or injury generally occur at the same time. The issue in Kief, thus,
does not often arise. However, if the amount of environmental litigation
does increase in North Dakota, more situations will arise where manifestation and occurrence are separated. North Dakota may someday also
seek, as did California, a bright-line rule for certainty in this first-party
context.
At the very least, insurance companies wishing to avoid this ambiguity in future first-party property policies will need to add language
specifically defining what event triggers coverage for progressive
damage, occurrence, or manifestation.
Aaron J. Dorrheim

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 35-36.
100. See Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 918 (Haw. 1994) (discussing public
policy reasons for certainty in determining possible claims).

